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DELIBERATING ABOUT DELIBERATION 
Frederick Schauer* 
WE THE PEOPLE: 1: FOUNDATIONS. By Bruce Ackerman. Cam-
bridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 1991. Pp. x, 
369. $24.95. 
It starts on the cover. Before the reader of Bruce Ackerman's We 
the People 1 even gets past the dustjacket, she is confronted with a late 
eighteenth-century aquatint entitled Election Day at the Statehouse, 
portraying a street scene in front of the Pennsylvania statehouse on 
election day. The artwork perfectly exemplifies a major theme of the 
book, in that it portrays most of the features that we associate with 
public political deliberation. One person is holding up a banner. An-
other is making a political speech to an audience questioning and re-
sponding to the speaker. Several people carry handwritten or simply 
printed political tracts, a number of small groups are engaged in seri-
ous discussion, and a somber and elderly gentleman is plainly dispens-
ing the political wisdom he has accumulated over many decades. 
Although the participants are all white, the presence of clearly en-
gaged women and children makes the point that active participation is 
not limited to those who then had the franchise. 
It's a nice picture. Indeed, without explicitly referring to this 
cover at all, Ackerman himself describes 
a pretty picture ... in which a rediscovered Constitution is the subject of 
an ongoing dialogue amongst scholars, professionals, and the people at 
large; an America in which this dialogue between theory and practice 
allows the citizenry, and its political representatives, a deepening sense of 
its historical identity as it faces the transforming challenges of the future. 
[p. 5] 
Although much in this book is worthy of note, I want to concen-
trate on Ackerman's pervasive and self-conscious treatment of this de-
liberative ideal, one that stresses public discourse as a method of value 
formation and governance, and one that dominates not only the pic-
ture on the cover, not only this book, and not only much of Acker-
man's work, but also much of contemporary constitutional and 
political theory. For although the normative desirability of delibera-
tion in the ideal setting that this book's cover portrays is hard to chal-
• Frank Stanton Professor of the First Amendment and Professorial Fellow of the Joan 
Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Govern-
ment, Harvard University. This review has benefited from conversations with and comments by 
Sanford Levinson, who still thinks I've got it all wrong. 
1. Bruce A. Ackerman is Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale University. 
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lenge, more difficult issues arise when nonideal deliberative settings 
reinforce rather than mitigate the darker side of public political life. 
To the extent that this occurs, deliberation may present problems 
rarely addressed in the celebrations of deliberation that dominate so 
much of contemporary constitutional and political theory. 
I 
In concentrating on deliberation, certainly one of Ackerman's 
main themes, I slight two others that deserve some note. One, the 
most explicit in the book, is Ackerman's description and endorsement 
of what he calls "dualist" democracy. Ackerman first distinguishes 
dualism from monism, the more conventional majoritarian conception 
of democracy that stresses the role of elections and the relationship 
between the political legitimacy of a program and the success of its 
promoters in "the last general election" (p. 8). To the monist, depar-
tures from majoritarianism are suspect, and the common phrase 
"countermajoritarian difficulty" suggests that when an institution 
(such as judicial review) operates other than to reinforce the results of 
the last general election, its legitimacy is suspect and in need of affirm-
ative justification.2 
Ackerman's dualist challenge to monism rests on the premise that 
the unique contribution of American political thought lies in its rejec-
tion of the European model of parliamentary sovereignty. Conse-
quently, Ackerman makes the empirical claim that Americans are not 
normally very much involved in the political decisions that affect 
them, the interpretive claim that this degree of noninvolvement in nor-
mal politics is consistent with American constitutional and political 
history, and the normative claim that such a state of affairs is nothing 
to worry about. Dualism is based on the proposition that not being 
politically involved on a regular basis is a perfectly legitimate life 
choice, that it is the life choice of most Americans, and that govern-
ance on the normal track proceeds by virtue of the hopefully public-
minded performance of duties by political professionals who use their 
own best judgment subject only to sporadic electoral validation or in-
validation. Normal politics is, with the consent of the people, largely 
the business of the politicians. 
But sometimes things are different. On occasion the people be-
come mobilized, creating and participating in a public-minded and ac-
tively engaged process of "higher lawmaking" that produces 
constitutional transformation. This process of higher lawmaking has 
produced - and indeed constitutes - the Constitution, which con-
sists of some combination of canonical texts, interpretive cases, and 
2. See especially ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); ALEX-
ANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CoNSENT (1975); see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970). 
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political understandings. Because these and only these products truly 
represent the considered wishes of the people, judicial enforcement of 
the products of higher lawmaking - even to strike down the "products 
of normal politics cannot fairly be described as 
countermajoritarian. Rather, judicial review is the way in which the 
population keeps watch on the process between those less frequent 
times when it desires to become more actively engaged (pp. 9-10, 139-
62, 266-319). 
Dualism differs not only from monism, but also from what Acker-
man calls "rights foundationalism,"3 the view that there are human 
rights antecedent to the decisions of a given polity and, further, that 
the enforcement of those rights is a significant part of a proper under-
standing of American constitutionalism. In contrast to rights founda-
tionalism, dualism treats as paramount the decisions of the people so 
long as they are made on the constitutional track, and thus requires 
the courts to enforce even those decisions of the people that the rights 
foundationalist would see as immoral violations of fundamental 
human rights (pp. 10-16). 
Ackerman's distinction between dualism and monism seems sensi-
ble enough, 4 but his treatment of rights foundationalism is curious. At 
various times Ackerman offers some half hearted sympathy with 
rights foundationalism, especially when he argues that he would have 
no objection to the entrenchment of constitutional rights against even 
constitutional change, 5 but the general tenor of this book plainly 
3. Pp. 10-16. Foundationalism is a bit of a pejorative in some modern legal and political 
theory, e.g .• DON HERZOG, WITHOUT FOUNDATIONS: JUSTIFICATION IN PoLmCAL THEORY 
(1985), and perhaps another term would have been preferable. Although some people who be-
lieve in prepolitical rights believe that those rights include or are limited to rights of property, not 
all so-called "foundationalists" take their guide exclusively from Locke and Lochner. Instead, as 
Ackerman quite properly recognizes, theorists like Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls, neither of 
whom places property rights near the center of his project, are foundationalists in Ackerman's 
sense. So also, I should note, are most of those who can talk without difficulty about interna-
tional human rights. 
4. By which I mean that I think I agree with it, and I think as well that agreement with it 
undergirds far more of American constitutional theory than Ackerman seems to acknowledge. 
Although I agree with him that actual governmental practice seems hardly to justify the adula-
tion and concomitant presumption of validity that pervades too much of the majoritarian tradi-
tion, I am not sure why those who would have the Court apply the text of the Constitution with 
some vigor but be reluctant to depart from it, see, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Consti-
tution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981), cannot also be seen as dualists in Ackerman's precise 
sense. Given that both Ely and Ackerman see the roots and legitimacy of judicial review in 
terms of judicial enforcement of considered and entrenched popular choices, the difference be-
tween them turns on the question, which I take up below, whether those choices may be en-
trenched other than through the procedures of Article V. This is an important question, but 
nevertheless the difference between Ackerman and most modern constitutional majoritarians is 
considerably less than Ackerman supposes. 
5. Pp. 15-16, 319-22. Neither Ackerman nor I is a logician, but the logical paradoxes of 
entrenchment and self-amendment are worth noting. Can that part of a written constitution 
making all or part of the same document unamendable be amended? See, e.g., Denis V. Cowan, 
The Entrenched Sections of the South Africa Act, 10 S. AFRICAN L.J. 238 (1953). If so, then 
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clashes with the notion that there is enforceable law higher than the 
people's constitutional decisions. This tension strikes me as curious 
for several reasons. First, the rejection of rights foundationalism, at 
least as a point about metaethics and moral epistemology and not a 
point only about the power of the courts, causes one to wonder from 
whence comes the normative value of Ackerman's deliberative ideal. 
Moreover, the rejection of rights foundationalism presents a difficulty 
in explaining how the nonfoundationalist argues that we ought to have 
these rights and not those, for such arguments need some pre-delibera-
tive purchase. Finally, Ackerman's rejection of rights foundationalism 
avoids the question why rights foundationalism has been rejected. 
Ackerman's answer appeals to tradition, relying on American consti-
tutional and political history to make the claim that, whatever the al-
lure of rights foundationalism, it is not now and has never been the 
approach adopted by the people of the United States in understanding 
their Constitution (pp. 13-16). 
To the rights foundationalist, however, this is no answer at all. If 
there are rights antecedent to the decisions of the people, the absence 
of any popular decision to recognize those rights, even over an entire 
constitutional tradition, is hardly even persuasive, let alone dispositive. 
In the context of questions about international human rights, a context 
in which rights foundationalism is increasingly a global ideal, a na-
tion's wholesale denial of a body of rights thus appears only as evi-
dence of that nation's failure. One rarely hears arguments against 
condemning or sanctioning a nation because it has merely failed to 
enforce the rights that its constitutional tradition does not recognize. 
To the rights foundationalist, the morally responsible agent must 
act consistently with those rights of others that exist prior to and 
above the decisions of the political state. If that rights foundationalist 
entrenchment is illusory. If not, then why not? One answer is that there would be no procedure 
in the document for such amendment. But then the entire document could be replaced by one 
that resembled the original one in all respects except for the relevant amendment. In that case, 
the same type of political decision that caused the constitution to be the constitution in the first 
place could change that constitution, even those parts of the constitution that seemed explicitly 
unamendable. So entrenchment turns out to be less a legal concept than a political fact, but if it 
is a political fact then it may be so even if a constitutional text does not have explicit entrench-
ment provisions. As an example, note the recent debates about amending the First Amendment, 
particularly in the context of the defeated H.J. Res. 350 and S.J. Res. 332 (1990), both of which 
sought to overturn the result in United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990). Although the 
First Amendment is not one of the two or three explicitly unamendable provisions of the U.S. 
Constitution (Article V provides that no amendment shall deprive a state without its consent of 
its equal representation in the Senate and that no amendment can alter those provisions allowing 
slavery until the year 1808; somewhat more ambiguously, Article VI provides that "no religious 
Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office •.• ), the public and political discourse 
leading up to the recent rejection of the so-called Flag Burning Amendment lends support to the 
view that the First Amendment is politically even if not textually entrenched. Ackerman himself 
should be sympathetic to this claim, since, if the Constitution can be amended outside of the 
provisions of Article V, then parts of the Constitution might be entrenched outside of the provi-
sions of Article V. I pursue this issue further below, infra notes 8-18 and accompanying text. 
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rejects a strong sense of role morality, pursuant to which certain roles 
preclude agents from enforcing the rights they would enforce if they 
did not occupy those roles, then she will at least avoid contravening 
those Jj.ghts regardless of the role she holds. 6 Therefore, even if the 
rights foundationalist is a judge, she will not - in judging or else-
where - take actions inconsistent with the antecedent rights she rec-
ognizes. And if told that most of the society in which she operates has 
not recognized antecedent rights in general or some particular antece-
dent right, she is likely to respond that this is no argument against 
either their existence or her enforcement of them. 
This is not to say that rights foundationalism is right or wrong. 
Nor is it to say that Ackerman might not be correct in his interpretive 
claims about what is at the heart of the American political and consti-
tutional tradition. But unlike his predecessors in the enterprise of of-
fering comprehensive and profound accounts of the American 
constitutional tradition,7 Ackerman's historical, explanatory, and in-
terpretive claims have an explicit normative overlay. Political and 
constitutional prescription dominates this book in a way that it does 
not dominate others to which it otherwise might be compared. As a 
result, Ackerman's normative claims invite normative and not merely 
historical or interpretive evaluation. When we use normative terms to 
evaluate Ackerman's normative claims, we see that his observation 
that this society has in its constitutional text8 and tradition rejected 
rights foundationalism is, even if empirically correct, question-begging 
in the extreme. There are strong arguments against foundationalism, 
but one that takes antifoundationalism as its unargued premise is 
hardly likely to persuade the foundationalist. 
II 
As in his previous work,9 Ackerman makes much of those mo-
ments of great constitutional engagement that have produced extratex-
tual constitutional transformations. In particular, he sees both the 
6. On role morality, see FRANCIS H. BRADLEY, ETHICAL STUDIES 160 (2d ed. 1927) (view-
ing morality form the perspective of "my station and its duties"). For skepticism about role 
morality, see DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JusncE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988). See also 
THOMAS NAGEL, Ruthlessness in Public Life, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 75 (1979) (discussing the 
differences between private and public, role-centered morality). 
7. E.g., CHARLES A. BEARD, THE SUPREME CoURT AND THE CONSTITUTION (1912); 
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1969). 
8. In light of Ackerman's own endorsement of the idea of amendments outside of Article V, 
it is intriguing that he relies almost exclusively on the text in comparing the American rejection 
of entrenchment with the German acceptance of it. If the Constitution can be amended outside 
of Article V, then it can be amended outside of Article V to entrench all or part of itself. If so, it 
is possible, as some of the flag-desecration debates suggest, that parts of the Constitution are 
already entrenched. See supra note 4. · 
9. E.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 
1013 (1984); Bruce A. Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1164 
(1988). 
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Reconstruction and the New Deal as periods in which popular engage-
ment on the higher constitutional track has properly produced radical 
revisions not only in the way the Constitution was viewed, but also 
and consequently in the Constitution itself (pp. 81-130). And 
although the Reconstruction period produced the Thirteenth, Four-
teenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, the New Deal was no less a trans-
formation for having produced no modifications to the text of the 
document. 
As a matter of legal theory this is plainly right. As Hans Kelsen 
first recognized in his discussion of the Grundnorm, 10 and as H.L.A. 
Hart thereafter elaborated in his treatment of the ultimate rule of rec-
ognition, 11 laws gain legal validity by virtue of other and higher laws. 
When this progression runs out, however, leaving in question only the 
validity of the highest law of all, the notion of legal validity is mean-
ingless. The validity (if that is even the right word at this point) of the 
highest law - and thus of the legal system itself - is a political and 
sociological fact and not a legal question. 12 I could write a constitu-
tion tomorrow, literally appearing in all respects to be a constitution 
for the United States, and could incorporate within it conditions for its 
technical validity (when I sign it, or when the Yankees next win the 
World Series, for example) that would differ in no logical or textual 
way from the internal validity conditions contained in Article VII of 
the existing Constitution of the United States and satisfied in 1787. 
Thus the two documents would appear equally internally valid. An 
English-speaking visitor from Mars, for example, would not be able to 
discern merely from examining the documents and being told that 
each of their internal conditions for validity had been satisfied which 
one really constituted the constitution of the United States. 
The reason, of course, that our visitor from Mars would be con-
fused is that the acceptance of the Philadelphia-generated Constitution 
of the United States and not Fred's constitution of the United States as 
the constitution of the United States is a political and sociological fact. 
It is not a legal matter at all, but rather a set of circumstances about 
the empirical conditions under which a population and its officials 
treat the indications of a piece of paper as relevant.13 
Once we see this, a number of conclusions follow. First, a whole 
.range of understandings about what the Constitution says, including, 
for example, how we treat Supreme Court decisions, how we treat 
lower court decisions, how we treat historical executive and legislative 
10. HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (Anders Wedberg trans., 1945); 
HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (Max Knight trans., 1970). 
11. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 97-120, 245-46 (1961). 
12. See Iain Stewart, The Basic Norm as Fiction, 1980 JURJD. REV. 199. 
13. In somewhat different terms, this is what I see as one of the significant messages of SAN-
FORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988). 
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practices, the relevance of original intent, and why Ronald Dworkin is 
an acceptable citation in a Supreme Court opinion and Jeanne Dixon 
is not, are determined by the political and social decisions that pro-
duce the fact of those sources' acceptance or rejection. Second, if all of 
these are "part of" the Constitution, or not, because of supratextual or 
extratextual social decisions, then when society modifies its decisions 
in this regard the Constitution in any interesting sense changes as 
well. 14 Third, if the "small c" constitutionality of the "big C" Consti-
tution is a matter of social acceptance or nonacceptance, then there is 
no formal or logical reason why social acceptance or nonacceptance 
must necessarily be all-or-nothing. The social act that produces social 
acceptance could be a social act of accepting two thirds or three 
quarters or all but one provision of a particular text that happens to be 
headed "The Constitution of the United States." If the Grundnorm or 
the ultimate rule of recognition recognized all of the Constitution of 
the United States except the Third Amendment as the constitution of 
the United States, we would then say, neither illogically nor inconsis-
tently with these enduring lessons from two of the great figures of 
modern jurisprudence, that the constitution of the United States con-
sists of all of those provisions contained in a document headed the 
Constitution of the United States except for that part designated as 
"Amendment III." 
If the legal theory of social subtraction from the textual constitu-
tion is thus sound, then there is also no reason to suppose that there 
could not be an equally sound legal theory of social addition. 15 As 
long as society by its political act, and not the text by its own words, 
determines that the text, and how much of it, counts as the constitu-
tion, then society could by a parallel political act also determine that 
all of that text, and more, counts as the constitution of the United 
States. Indeed, the constitution of the United States might plausibly 
consist of the text of the Constitution itself; the Federalist Papers,· 
Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Constitution of the United 
States; and parts of the Mayflower Compact, the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, and the Emancipation Proclamation. 
14. This leads to difficult questions about when we can and cannot say that a legal order or 
constitutional system has changed or remained the same. See J.M. Finnis, Revolutions and Con· 
tinuity of Law, in OXFORD EssAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 44 (2d series, A.W.B. Simpson ed., 1973). 
Although this may seem like a substantively irrelevant semantic excursus, the question whether 
today's legal order is the "same" as yesterday's despite some changes has great import in the 
context of the question of the persistence of prerevolutionary laws after a legal and political 
revolution. See F.M. Brookfield, The Courts, Ke/sen, and the Rhodesian Revolution, 19 U. TO-
RONTO L.J. 326 (1969); J.W. Harris, When and Why Does the Grundnorm Change?, 29 CAM-
BRIDGE L.J. 103 (1971). The relevance of this question to current issues regarding Eastern 
Europe, the former Soviet Union, and South Africa should be apparent. 
15. On the possibilities of extra-textual addition and subtraction, see Sanford Levinson, Ac-
counting For Constitutional Change (Or, How Many Times Has the United States Constitution 
Been Amended? (A) <26; (BJ 26; (C) >26 (DJ All of the Above), 8 CONST. COMMENT. 409 
(1991). 
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Ackerman is thus right in maintaining that there can be amend-
ments to the Constitution outside of Article V, even though his insight 
is perhaps less novel to the traditional legal theorist than to the mod-
ern American constitutionalist.16 And to suppose that the period of 
Reconstruction and the New Deal Era produced such amendments is 
hardly implausible. But it is also possible that there were other ex-
tratextual amendments, or even that the process of extratextual 
amendment is continuous. The plainly publicly engaged process -
constitutional politics - that led to the denial of confirmation of 
Judge Bork, for example, may itself have been a process of extratex-
tual amendment17 that made rights foundationalism, for example, 
somewhat more a part of the Constitution than it had been previously 
(and than Ackerman would suppose). And it is further possible that 
the "natural rights" debate accompanying Justice Thomas's confirma-
tion was also a constitutional moment (or might have become so, were 
it not overshadowed by other events) that led to somewhat less rights 
foundationalism than had existed in the era after Bork but before 
Thomas.18 
Acknowledging the continually evolving character of the 
Grundnorm that supports the constitutionality of the Constitution is 
consistent with Ackerman's notion of amendments outside Article V 
- but less so with the stress that Ackerman places on a small number 
of constitutional moments different in kind from other constitutional 
transformations. Although Ackerman gives us criteria for when 
higher lawmaking exists, and thus may be enforced by the courts even 
if not consistent with Article V, he fails to come to grips with the 
political and constitutional import of shifts in background understand-
ings that do not meet these criteria. To appreciate this problem, it 
might be useful to draw a distinction between how the Constitution 
looks to the external observer and how it looks to a court considering 
whether to invalidate the product of a legislature. With respect to the 
former, it seems implausible to suppose that the Constitution changes 
16. In the existing literature, the most jurisprudentially sophisticated treatment of constitu-
tional transformations in the American context is Robert Justin Lipkin's. See Robert J. Lipkin, 
The Anatomy of Constitutional Revolutions, 68 NEB. L. REv. 701 (1989); Robert J. Lipkin, Con· 
ventionalism, Pragmatism, and Constitutional Revolutions, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 645 (1988); 
see also Akhil R. Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1043 (1988). 
17. Ackerman describes the Bork nomination fight as a "failed constitutional moment." P. 
56. But what was a failure for the President who nominated Bork may have been a success to 
Bork's opponents. My point is that in Ackerman's terms the defeat of Bork may have been more 
than just an attempt at a constitutional moment that misfired, but rather a constitutional mo-
ment that succeeded in entrenching the idea of unenumerated rights in general and the right to 
privacy in particular, as subsequent nomination hearings have made clear. 
18. See Robert F. Nagel, No Show: Reform the Hearings, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 7, 1991, at 
20; Stuart Taylor, Jr., Supreme Disappointment: What's Really Wrong with the Way We Choose 
Supreme Court Justices, AM. LAW., Nov. 1991, at 5; The Thomas Nomination, NEW REPUBLIC, 
Oct. 7, 1991, at 7. 
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only when either amended under Article V or by those few constitu-
tional moments that satisfy Ackerman's criteria. But even if constitu-
tional transformation is more fluid than sporadic, Ackerman could 
still maintain that a court self-consciously considering invalidating the 
products of a political process needs firmer moorings. He could argue 
that courts need criteria of constitutional recognition, some way of 
demarcating between those subtle shifts that transform all participants 
in a process and those more dramatic ones that change how an institu-
tion will see its own role. Otherwise, he might say, courts would see 
themselves as constrained only by the operation of an external political 
process, doing whatever they could get away with and in the process 
defining constitutionalism and their role only by the after-the-fact em-
pirical identification of what they did get away with. Such an outlook, 
as the standard critiques of Realism make clear, would be of little help 
from the standpoint of the judge trying to decide what to do. 19 In 
order to avoid this problem, Ackerman's position might include both 
the normative claim that judges should respect only those extratextual 
modifications of the text that satisfy his criteria, and the descriptive 
claim that they have in fact generally done so. 
Although I have serious problems with the descriptive claim,20 I 
want to focus instead on the normative. If courts operating in dualist 
mode should respect all of the products of normal politics except when 
those products interfere with the mandate of a textualized or nontex-
tualized constitutional moment, then we need a normative account of 
why this should be so. Such an account would have to have two com-
ponents, each of which suggests a possible alternative to Ackerman's 
perspective. One component would question the court's unwillingness 
to intervene in cases of normal politics, and here the rights foundation-
alist becomes a major figure. If normal politics generates a result that 
a court perceives to be morally wrong but that a constitutionally en-
gaged public has never previously perceived to have been morally 
wrong, then judicial intervention without something that looks like 
rights foundationalism becomes puzzling. 
Take, for example, Ackerman's defense of Griswold v. Connecti-
cut. 21 Because he rejects rights foundationalism, and because nothing 
19. See HART, supra note 10, at 121-50. Hart's critique is adopted in Ronald Dworkin's 
rejection of "external skepticism." RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 34-35 (1986). On the 
crucial question of "standpoint," and on how the soundness of Legal Realism necessarily de-
pends on standpoint, see WILLIAM TwINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVE-
MENT (1973). 
20. Descriptively I do not challenge Ackerman's argument that a constitutional moment in 
his sense is a sufficient condition for judicial use of the substantive transformations of that mo-
ment. I do challenge, however, the view that constitutional moments are necessary conditions, 
and I believe instead that judges' views of the Constitution's substance and sources of interpreta-
tion change far more frequently than the focus on constitutional moments would indicate. 
21. 381 U.S. 479 (1965), discussed at pp. 150-62; see also Richard J. Fallon, Jr., Common 
Law Court or Council of Revision, 101 YALE L.J. 949, 969 n.109 (1992) (book review). Acker-
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resembling Griswold-variety privacy was ever at the fore of public de-
bate during a process of constitutional lawmaking, Ackerman's de-
fense must rely on what seems to me to be a strained interpretation of 
what the people were actually talking about in 1787, 1791, 1866, or 
1937. Now others would describe what seems to me to be strained as 
"creative," but here that is exactly the point, because then Ackerman 
needs to claim not only that the people did such-and-such during their 
constitutional moment, but also that they authorized the court to in-
terpret what they did with a considerable degree of creativity. Then 
things get even more sticky. If the people authorized the kind of crea-
tive synthesis that gets from the text, the founding, Reconstruction, 
and the New Deal to Griswold, then why not just say that the people 
authorized what is in effect rights foundationalism? If courts are au-
thorized by and in the name of the people to identify rights that the 
people in their own constitutional moments did not identify, then judi-
cial power turns out to emanate from the authority of the courts in 
Dworkinian fashion to make the people's actual choices the best they 
can be. 22 • 
Two further possibilities present themselves. One can, like Dwor-
kin, be without embarassment a rights foundationalist of sorts, taking 
the court's power to operate in this way to be right because it is right, 
and not only because the people have deliberatively authorized that 
course. But if there is space between Ackerman and Dworkin - and 
much of Ackerman's interpretive method strikes me as quite 
Dworkinian - it is precisely because of the difference between moral 
rectitude and popular deliberative authorization. Ackerman's norma-
tive preference for the latter, however, risks some self-contradiction. 
If the people have authorized rights foundationalism, then on a day-
to-day (or even year-to-year) basis, nothing turns on the difference be-
tween dualism and rights-foundationalism except the formal power of 
the people to withdraw their authorization for rights foundationalism 
in the latter case but not in the former. But Ackerman's rejection of 
rights foundationalism is stronger, for he wants to claim that the peo-
ple have not authorized the courts to engage in that process at all. If 
the people have not authorized rights foundationalism, but have en-
gaged in the process of authorizing courts to create an interpretive 
synthesis out of what they have explicitly done, then Ackerman must, 
as both Dworkin and his critics have, take on the serious issue of the 
role of morality in interpretation, in light of the fact that the available 
interpretive field will underdetermine the result, just as any available 
field of data will underdetermine the interpretation or explanation of 
man's denial that Griswold and Brown are much more than reinforcements of then.existing con· 
stitutional understandings is powerfully criticized in Lawrence G. Sager, The Incorrigible 
Constitution, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 893 (1990). 
22. DWORKIN, supra note 18, at 225-75; see also RONALD DWORKIN, A MATIER OF PRIN· 
CIPLE 119-77 (1985). 
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that data. 23 
But if what the people have actually deliberated about is subject to 
interpretation so as to include what they have not explicitly deliber-
ated about, then what role is deliberation playing? It must play a big 
role for Ackerman, because only deliberation separates him from the 
rights foundationalists who would reach the same result in Griswold 
without needing to see the result as the product of a series of delibera-
tions. Moreover, it is what privileges the constitutional moments over 
normal politics. If Ackerman were, like Ely and others, to offer an 
account of textual exclusivity, he could rely less on the virtues of delib-
eration.24 But because for Ackerman some but not all extra-textual 
political events rise to constitutional proportion, and because the dis-
tinction between those that do and those that do not turns on the pres-
ence or absence of widespread and engaged public deliberation of a 
certain sort, then we must turn to the second component of the under-
pinnings of Ackerman's normative claims and ask, in a nonquestion-
begging way, what is so special about deliberation? 
III 
So what is so unique about deliberation and its products, making 
deliberation of a certain kind, but nothing else, a sufficient condition 
for constitutional transformation? We can approach the question in 
two ways. One would start with the premise that deliberation just is 
democracy, and that Ackerman is following Alexander Meiklejohn in 
seeing the population as a New England town meeting writ large.25 
Meiklejohn recognized, however, that New England town meetings 
take place once a year, with "normal politics" taking place between 
town meetings with little popular involvement. But if Ackerman is 
operating within the Meiklejohnian tradition, we may ask what is so 
good about a New England town meeting (a question more likely to be 
asked by those who have attended one). The New England town 
meeting does provide an exercise in engaged majoritarianism, but why 
do we think that is a good thing? 
It might be good for one of four reasons. First, majoritarianism 
fosters an independent value of equality, for a system in which every-
one participates equally serves equality values independent of the re-
sults of the participation. Second, majoritarianism serves an 
independent value of self-government, here seen as the political exten-
23. See Lawrence A. Alexander & Michael D. Bayles, Hercules or Proteus? The Many The-
ses of Ronald Dworkin, 5 Soc. THEORY & PRACTICE 267 (1980); Frederick Schauer, An Essay on 
Constitutional Language, 29 UCLA L. REv. 797, 814-21 (1982); A.D. Woozley, No Right An-
swer, in RONALD DWORKIN AND CONTEMPORARY JURISPRUDENCE 173 (Marshall Cohen ed., 
1983). 
24. E.g .• pp. 197-99. 
25. ALEXANDER MEIKLE10HN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 
(1948). 
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sion of individual freedom in the sense of the ability to make decisions 
about one's own life. Third, majoritarianism might, for those who re-
ject foundationalism or any other conception of prepolitical rights an-
tecedent to political decision, be the only way to define rights. Fourth, 
even if majoritarianism (or consensus, which is similar but hardly 
identical) is not the only way to define rights, it still might be the best 
way to discover what rights there actually are. 
Note that none of these, and especially neither of the first two, is 
necessarily connected with deliberation. Democracy, defined for the 
moment in a thin majoritarian manner, might exist in a number of 
ways placing less stress on deliberation. Voting is one example, and so 
are various other ways of registering preferences. But although seri-
ous questions can be asked about the virtues and vices of government 
based on citizen preferences, Ackerman's agenda is different. He priv-
ileges public-regarding rather than private-regarding preferences,26 
and he privileges the products of deliberative engagement over other 
forms of articulation of public-regarding preferences. 
So what are the special values of deliberation, above and beyond 
what might be good about government based on the public-regarding 
preferences of the entire citizenry? One possibility is that deliberation 
might serve as a check on the nature of the reasons employed in deci-
sionmaking. If private preferences count for less than public ones, 
then the reasons behind preferences matter, and perhaps the only way 
we can evaluate preferences is to have them publicly defended. Public 
deliberation is thus a way to ensure that reasons are public-regarding, 
although in some sense this is only a play on words. Even if we said 
that only private-regarding reasons counted, public articulation might 
still be the only way of determining that the reasons were of the quali-
fying kind. And if we saw deliberation as performing this kind of a 
"testing" function, then certain concrete consequences might follow. 
We would want deliberation to be more adversarial, more combative, 
more oriented toward cross-examination, and in many other ways 
designed to filter the reasons offered in public debate. 
For someone who, like Ackerman, distinguishes good (for these 
purposes) from bad (for these purposes) reasons, this testing function 
of public deliberation is crucially important. It is thus not surprising 
that others in the republican tradition, scholars like Frank 
26. For an insightful critique of Ackerman's distinction among preferences, as well as a 
strong criticism of Ackerman's history, see Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitu-
tional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce Ackerman's Theory of Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN. L. 
REV. 759 (1992) (book review). 
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Michelman,21 Suzanna Sherry,28 Cass Sunstein,29 and Martha Mi-
now,30 place such a heavy emphasis on the judiciary.31 If your pri-
mary materials are judicial opinions, then you are prone to see a world 
in which the constraints of result-justifying and opinion-writing are 
apparent.32 Judges sometimes say "it won't write," meaning that 
there are some reasons that will not stand the test of public explana-
tion. Not all of political life imposes this test. Indeed, one way of 
understanding the focus on deliberation is by seeing it as a way to 
impose a valuable feature of judicial justificatory methodology on a 
wider range of public acts, especially those with constitutional 
implications. 
Delibei;ation might serve another purpose, albeit one somewhat 
less (or more contingently) related to the distinction between the pri-
vate-regarding and the public-regarding reason. We might also think 
of deliberation as a way of identifying the best policy, where the crite-
rion for and definition of the best policy is at least conceptually in-
dependent of the deliberative process but where the deliberative 
process might be the method most apt to locate and implement the 
best policy. Take as an example the New Deal and its rejection of 
laissez-faire. Now if we assume that the rejection of pre-New Deal 
laissez-faire was a good idea independent of the process that produced 
it, then one way of thinking about this constitutional moment is as the 
product of a more reliable process. Normal politics produces results, 
and public deliberation produces results, and the results of public de-
liberation might in the aggregate be better than the results of normal 
politics. 
The claim that public deliberation is methodologically superior for 
identifying deliberation-independent social goods is an empirical 
claim, and like all empirical claims it is contingent, both in the sense 
that it might be wrong and in the sense that, even if now right, it might 
be wrong at other times or in different places. There is a plausible 
story that this empirical claim is not correct, 33 one that starts with a 
variant of Gresham's Law and the view that bad arguments drive out 
good. It then proceeds to the further premises that public deliberation 
27. See Frank Michelman, Law'.s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Frank I. Michelman, 
The Supreme Court 1985 Term - Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. R.Ev. 4 
(1986). 
28. See Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 1127 
(1987). 
29. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A PARTIAL CoNSTITUTION (forthcoming 1993). 
30. See Martha Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term - Foreword: Justice Engendered, 
101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987). 
31. Contrast Kathryn Abrams, Law's Republicanism, 91 YALE L.J. 1591 (1988). 
32. See Frank I. Michelman, Justification (and Justifiability) of Law in a Contradictory 
World, in JUSTIFICATION: NOMOS XXVIII 71 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 
1986). 
33. Cf. Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503 (1990). 
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lowers rather than raises the quality of consideration, increases the 
likelihood that bad arguments will be accepted and good ones rejected, 
overly empowers the rhetorician and the demagogue, and exacerbates 
the disempowerment of those already disempowered on the basis of 
race, gender, class, wealth, physical attractiveness, and all of the other 
features that distinguish the empowered from the disempowered. 
This is not the end of the story, however, for much the same could 
and does happen in normal politics. So if there is an argument against 
the deliberative ideal, it is that normal politics tempers rather than 
exacerbates or replicates the pathologies of public deliberation. Much 
that takes place out of the public eye in normal politics might, for 
example, involve reasonably well-meaning people's offering some 
resistance to the demagoguery that might play better on the public 
podium than it does in the offices of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission or the conference room of the Supreme Court. Normal poli-
tics, much of it taking place out of sight, might also, however, involve 
officials' putting their hands in the till, literally and figuratively, to the 
detriment of the public interest. And public comment might add more 
than it subtracts from normal politics as a decisionmaking process. 
But let us not forget that the New Deal itself was a product of normal 
politics, even if Ackerman is right in saying that its constitutional em-
bodiment was constitutional politics. Let us also not forget that nor-
mal politics produced the Equal Rights Amendment and public 
deliberation rejected it (admittedly with the assistance of the three-
fourths rule), all of which is only to say that if we have a notion of 
prepolitical desirability and undesirability, then it is an empirical ques-
tion whether the increased deliberation that Ackerman celebrates gets 
us there more often than the filtered, tempered, and dampened process 
that Ackerman calls "normal politics." And if there is no reason to 
celebrate large-scale deliberation specially, then a judge would have no 
reason to treat the products of that process any differently from the 
products of the process of normal politics. 
But suppose that Ackerman, especially given his qualified hostility 
to rights foundationalism, gets nervous when people talk about prede-
liberative or prepolitical desirability or soundness or truth. He might 
then, in company with a range of thinkers from Holmes to Habermas, 
believe that what is special about deliberation is that deliberation is the 
process by which values, and not just our values, get created. But the 
deliberation priority of Holmes was a product of a pervasive value-
skepticism that Ackerman might wish to reject, 34 and that of 
Habermas a philosophical construct presupposing an ideal speech situ-
ation that certainly Habermas himself does not suppose we are close to 
reaching.35 Aside from these two positions, however, there may not be 
34. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
35. See generally JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 
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any room left for other varieties of a view that takes deliberation as 
soundness-constitutive rather than merely soundness-identifying. 36 
The problems with taking deliberation as constitutive of political 
truth are well known. If political truth is the product of deliberation, 
then what is the normative purchase for what people say when they 
are in the process of deliberating? Without an antecedent conception 
of what might make one idea better than another, participants in a 
deliberation are reduced to the articulation of personal preferences, 
without having any way of convincing others that their preferences are 
better. 
So if the standard critique is sound, and political truth cannot be 
defined in terms of deliberation, then there must be a gap between 
political truth and constitutional truth, with the latter but not the for-
mer defined by the process of deliberation. But even apart from the 
fact that this will hardly satisfy the rights foundationalist, a combina-
tion of empirical and normative questions still abounds. As Habermas 
might be read to recognize, but Ackerman does not recognize, the nor-
mative entrenchment of the deliberative ideal when we are not in an 
ideal speech situation runs the risk of entrenching the nonideality and 
its components every bit as much as it holds open the possibility that 
deliberation will transcend the harms that members of the deliberative 
community might otherwise be inclined to impose on each other. 
This is why Ackerman's historical approach is puzzling. Even 
apart from whether he gives us good history or not, which I have no 
ability to judge, he certainly does not give us an account of why our 
history and our traditions should be the normative starting point for 
how we now see our Constitution. Ackerman might think that this 
entrenchment of the past is desirable because it is either substantively 
good or because the very pastness of the past, and the very continuity 
that its entrenchment would represent, are desirable in their own 
right. 37 He appears to believe, however, that what is good about our 
past is not only its pastness, and not only that it has produced some 
good results, but also that it has embodied an ideal of deliberation that 
(Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984); JORGEN HABERMAS, TOWARD A RATIONAL SOCIETY (Jer-
emy J. Shapiro trans., 1970); THOMAS A. McCARTHY, THE CRmCAL THEORY OF JORGEN 
HABERMAS (1978); MARY HESSE, Habermas' Consensus Theory of Truth, in REVOLUTIONS AND 
RECONSTRUCTIONS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 206 (1980). On the application of 
Habermasian ideas to legal and constitutional argumentation and justification, see especially 
ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTATION: THE THEORY OF RATIONAL DIS-
COURSE AS THEORY OF LEGAL JUSTIFICATION (Ruth Adler & Neil MacCormick trans., 1989). 
In the American context, see Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: 
Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. 
REv. 601 (1990). 
36. On this distinction, see also FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
ENQUIRY 15-34 (1982) (book review). 
37. For a powerful critique of this book along these lines, see Suzanna Sherry, The Ghost of 
Liberalism Past, 105 HARV. L. REv. 918 (1992) (book review). 
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ought to be admired and replicated. But deliberation as an ideal seems 
self-evidently desirable only when all of the conditions of nonoppres-
sion in the deliberative setting are present, in which case whether we 
need deliberation at all might be open to question. But if those condi-
tions are not present, as they have not been throughout American his-
tory, then there are difficult empirical questions to confront. Even if 
liberal dialogue and its consequent repression of selfishness is norma-
tively desirable as ideal theory, 38 whether we would want to have it as 
constitutional prescription before the conditions for its desirability are 
satisfied is questionable. Do we now make ourselves better by search-
ing for more fora for deliberation? Or do we recognize that delibera-
tion now exists in a nonideal world where talk can oppress as well as 
liberate, where deliberation caµ produce majoritarian tyranny as well 
as individual liberation, and where the social identification of the lead-
ing participants in a deliberation is as likely to reinforce as to chal-
lenge the existing social structures that in this nonideal world 
determine who speaks and who is spoken to, who controls and who is 
controlled, and who has power and who is subject to it? Until we 
confront these questions, the jump (rom deliberation as ideal to delib-
eration as policy is far more difficult than Ackerman has yet 
acknowledged. 
38. See Bruce Ackerman, Why Dialogue?, 86 J. PHIL. 5 (1989). 
